ACTUARIAL NOTE

Number 142
January 1999

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Office of the Chief Actuary

 

Social Security Trust Fund Investment Policies and Practices

by Jeffrey L. Kunkel

Introduction

With trust fund assets growing from just under $46 billion at the end of September 1986 to over $730 billion at the end of September 1998, interest earnings from the investment of trust fund assets have been an increasing percentage of trust fund income. (See the table below.) As the trust funds continue to grow over the next several years, this trend will continue. Without changes to present law, future expenditures are expected to first exceed future tax income in 2013 or thereabouts. Interest earnings will then play an even more important role in financing the Social Security program.

Table 1.--Interest Income as a Percent of Total Trust Fund Income,
Fiscal Years 1987-98

(Amounts in millions)


Fiscal
year 1


Interest
income


Total
income


Interest as a
percent of
total income


1987

$4,638

$226,893

2.0

1988

6,500

258,090

2.5

1989

10,310

284,936

3.6

1990

14,909

306,822

4.9

1991

19,759

322,611

6.1

1992

23,637

338,270

7.0

1993

26,788

351,354

7.6

1994

29,203

376,307

7.8

1995

33,304

396,276

8.4

1996

36,508

416,064

8.8

1997

41,215

446,553

9.2

1998

46,632

478,608

9.7


1 The government's fiscal year is the 12-month period ending September 30.

Note: Interest income includes minor interest adjustments on certain interfund transfers and reimbursements.

Each year the Board of Trustees for the Social Security Trust Funds issues a report on the financial adequacy of these trust funds, the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds. The last several annual reports by the Board have predicted the exhaustion of the combined funds by about 2030. This solvency issue has led many people to focus on investment policy to see if the funds might receive a greater rate of return if a different investment policy were substituted. This note 1 lays out the current investment policies and practices to provide background information needed for a rational debate on the merits of change.

Table A1 in the appendix to this note shows the invested assets of the trust funds as of September 30, 1998. The Social Security Administration's Internet site has links to this table and to data on the fiscal operations of the trust funds. The address for such financial data is http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/funds.html. The financial data are updated monthly.

Information concerning the performance of invested assets held by the trust funds can be found in Actuarial Note 138, "Effective Annual Interest Rates Earned by the OASI and DI Trust Funds, 1940-96." The effective annual interest rates earned by the trust funds are updated annually on the Internet at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/intRates.html.

Current Investment Policies and Practices

With but one exception, the current policies governing investment of trust fund assets were adopted in 1960 or earlier. Many of these policies actually date back to the original Social Security Act of 1935.

The framework and many of the details of trust fund investment policy are established in law. Policies enacted in 1935 and still in effect today provide that:

Three other statutory policies also govern trust fund investment. These varied in the early years of the Social Security program, but have been unchanged since 1960 or before. They provide that:

Finally, several essential elements of investment policy are addressed by the law in ways that require administrative interpretation, or are not addressed at all. Primary examples of the former have already been mentioned above. These are the statutory policies and administrative interpretations governing the purchase of special versus marketable obligations, and the selection of maturity dates for special obligations. In addition, the law is silent on the policy to be followed in redeeming obligations. Two administrative policies have been adopted to fill this void.

While stipulating how interest rates on special-issue obligations should be determined, the law is silent on how frequently interest should be credited to the trust funds. In keeping with the above administrative policy on maturities, interest on special-issue obligations is paid at the end of June. It has been Treasury's policy to pay interest semiannually on marketable notes and bonds, and that policy has continued with special-issue obligations. Thus, interest on these obligations is also paid at the end of December. In addition, when securities are redeemed to pay expenses, interest accrued to the redemption date is paid. (The amount of securities redeemed is generally such that this amount plus the accrued interest is just sufficient to cover the expense.)

The certificates of indebtedness and all other Treasury special obligations issued to the funds thus have three important properties. They (1) are redeemable at par at any time, (2) carry an interest rate determined for the month of issuance in accordance with the statutory average market yield formula, and (3) pay interest semiannually on June 30 and December 31, or upon redemption.

The Department of the Treasury, acting on the instructions of the Managing Trustee (the Secretary of the Treasury), currently uses the following investment procedures for Social Security's OASI and DI Trust Funds.

As individual income taxes and Social Security payroll taxes are received daily throughout a month, the general fund of the Treasury transfers to the trust funds an estimated proportion of these taxes until the total of the daily transfers equals a predetermined estimate. If the total of the daily transfers fails to meet this estimate by the end of the month, additional funds are transferred on the last business day to exactly meet the estimate. 3 The estimated tax transfers are allocated between the two funds in proportion to the statutory OASI and DI tax rates. The transferred funds are immediately invested in certificates of indebtedness, the special obligations that mature on the following June 30. Other trust fund income during the month is also invested in certificates of indebtedness immediately upon receipt.

All trust fund investment in special obligations is, however, subject to the statutory limit on total public debt outstanding. The gross Federal debt includes amounts owed to Federal trust funds, including the Social Security trust funds. New Treasury obligations cannot be issued to the trust funds if doing so would cause the debt limit to be exceeded.

If trust fund income consistently equaled or exceeded outgo over a long period, then on June 30 the non-mature investments of the trust funds would have maturities more or less evenly spread over the next 1 to 14 years. The certificates of indebtedness and other special issues that have just matured would then first be reinvested with 15-year maturities to fill the gap in the portfolio, with any excess being spread evenly over each of the 15 years of maturity in the investment period. This in fact is now the case with the OASI Trust Fund. In the early 1980s, however, a funding crisis required that all of the securities of the OASI Trust Fund be redeemed to pay benefits. Subsequent reinvestment over the next few years was broadly spread over the entire 15-year maturity period in order to restore the OASI portfolio. The situation for the DI Trust Fund is similar, but the funding crisis occurred more recently and was resolved in 1994 before the fund became exhausted.

The following table contrasts the reinvestment of maturing securities, or roll over, for the OASI Trust Fund on June 30, 1984, with that for June 30, 1998. Note that for 1984 about 31 percent of the total available for roll over was put into a one-year bond. This was done because bonds would need to be redeemed before a sufficient amount of certificates of indebtedness had accumulated to pay expenses and no other bonds matured in the short term. In 1998, on the other hand, about 33 percent of the total available for roll over was put into a 15-year bond.

Table 2.--"Roll Over" of Maturing Securities Into Special-Issue Bonds
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, June 30 of 1984 and 1998

(In millions)


Maturity
year


June 30, 1984


 

Maturity
year


June 30, 1998


Before


Roll over


After


Before


Roll over


After


1985

--

$5,262

$5,262

1999

$37,090

$6,169

$43,259

1986

--

1,492

1,492

2000

37,090

6,169

43,259

1987

--

1,492

1,492

2001

37,090

6,169

43,259

1988

--

1,492

1,492

2002

37,090

6,169

43,259

1989

$155

1,337

1,492

2003

37,090

6,169

43,259

1990

1,022

470

1,492

2004

37,090

6,169

43,259

1991

1,022

470

1,492

2005

37,090

6,169

43,259

1992

1,022

470

1,492

2006

37,090

6,169

43,259

1993

1,022

470

1,492

2007

37,090

6,169

43,259

1994

1,022

470

1,492

2008

37,090

6,169

43,259

1995

1,022

470

1,492

2009

37,090

6,169

43,259

1996

1,022

470

1,492

2010

37,090

6,169

43,259

1997

1,022

470

1,492

2011

37,090

6,169

43,259

1998

1,022

470

1,492

2012

37,090

6,169

43,259

1999

0

1,492

1,492

2013

0

43,259

43,259


Total

9,355

16,794

26,149

Total

519,254

129,629

648,884


Note: Totals may not equal the sum of rounded components.

The funding crisis in the early 1980s led Congress to change the mechanism of transferring estimated tax receipts to the trust funds by having the entire estimated monthly receipts deposited on the first day of the month. Such "advance tax transfers" ensured that more funds would be available for paying benefits early in the month and minimized the redemption of bonds. The legislation that brought about the advance tax transfers was part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983. The legislation also provided that the trust funds would pay interest semiannually to the general fund of the Treasury on what amounted to monthly short-term loans. Congress amended the advance tax transfer provisions in November 1990 so that such transfers would only be made to a fund if its assets were otherwise insufficient to pay benefits.

When benefits are paid, securities must be redeemed. The timing of the redemptions, however, depends on the extent to which payments are made by paper check versus direct electronic fund transfers to banks or other financial institutions. In the case of beneficiaries paid by direct deposit, redemption of securities occurs on the payment date. Payment of checks is made by charging the Treasury's general account as checks clear. Redemption of obligations held by the trust funds to reimburse the general account is made on a schedule that takes into account the average of the dates the checks are actually negotiated. This effectively gives the trust funds the benefit of the "float" between the date checks are written by Treasury and the dates they are negotiated. As an increasingly higher percentage of benefits are paid by direct deposit, however, the value of the float has steadily diminished.

If trust fund outgo exceeds income by substantial amounts or for a number of months, funds available from the redemption of short-term obligations may be insufficient to cover costs. In this case, it becomes necessary to redeem longer-term securities as well.

A more complex and less obvious set of circumstances occasionally occurred in the 1980s, when the advance tax transfer could not be invested in certificates of indebtedness because the limit on Federal debt had been reached and the Treasury was prevented from issuing new debt. Longer-term obligations then had to be redeemed in order to pay benefits. When the Treasury's cash balances became extremely low, these obligations were redeemed prior to the payment of benefits in order to create borrowing authority and use it to borrow from the public the cash needed to make the benefit payments. This practice also enabled the Federal government to continue other, non-Social-Security financial transactions for a longer period than otherwise could have occurred. As a result, the Treasury action was viewed by some as an inappropriate use of Social Security funds and was the source of considerable controversy. In retrospect, however, it was agreed by most knowledgeable observers that Treasury had few options and had taken the best course of action during a very difficult period.

Trust Fund Investment Principles

The principles that have heretofore guided trust fund investment are not explicitly set forth in the law. The legislative history of the Social Security Act provides only a partial guide to their nature and intent. As often as not, the principles and their rationale must be inferred from the specific legal and administrative policies adopted to govern investment of the funds during the past 60 years.

The legal and administrative policies that have governed the investment of trust fund assets appear to be premised on four interrelated principles. These principles are: (1) non-intervention in the private economy; (2) investment only in financially secure instruments; (3) maintenance of general neutrality in the financial dealings between the trust funds and the general fund of the Treasury; and (4) minimal, or non-active, management and investment decision-making by the Managing Trustee.

Principle 1: Non-intervention in the private economy

Trust fund investment policy, both statutory and administrative, has always been non-interventionist with respect to the private economy and private (or non-Federal) capital markets. This principle underlies the legal requirement that trust fund assets be invested only in U.S. obligations. It was explicitly addressed by the 1959 Advisory Council on Social Security, whose report stated:

The Council recommends that investment of the trust funds should, as in the past, be restricted to obligations of the United States Government. Departure from this principle would put trust fund operations into direct involvement in the operation of the private economy or the affairs of State and local governments. Investment in private business corporations could have unfortunate consequences for the social security system--both financial and political--and would constitute an unnecessary interference with our free enterprise economy. Similarly, investment in the securities of State and local governments would unnecessarily involve the trust funds in affairs which are entirely apart from the social security system.

The principle of non-intervention is also reflected in the creation and use of non-marketable, special obligations as the primary investment vehicle for the funds. Although statutory policy has always permitted investment in marketable U.S. obligations and, in fact, favored it in some of the earlier years of the program, the consistent administrative policy has been to invest trust fund assets almost exclusively in special obligations. This practice was adopted, at least in part, to avoid the market disruptions that might result from the purchase or sale by the trust funds of large blocks of marketable U.S. obligations in the open market and the appearance of U.S. government interference in open market operations of the Federal Reserve.

Principle 2: Security

Since the beginning of the program, the law has required that trust fund assets be invested only in "interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States." This provides the investments of the funds with the greatest possible protection against the risk of loss of principal or interest due to default.

To the degree that the trust funds purchase marketable U.S. obligations some risk of loss (and, conversely, prospect of gain) due to market fluctuations would be entailed if they were not held until maturity. Practice for many years has been to hold all marketable obligations until maturity unless their sale was required to make benefit payments.

Much more important, however, is the historic practice of investing the vast majority of trust fund assets in special obligations. These securities are purchased at par and can be redeemed at any time at par plus accrued interest. Thus, they are wholly risk free.

In summary, the law since the beginning of the Social Security program has provided that the trust funds be invested in the most secure obligations available, those of the U.S. government. Administrative policy has been to further ensure against risk due to market fluctuations by investing primarily in special obligations.

Principle 3: Neutrality

Trust fund investment policies have, for the most part, followed a principle of neutrality, in the sense that they have generally been intended neither to advantage or disadvantage the trust funds (the lenders) with respect to other Federal accounts (the borrowers). The underlying concept is that when the trust funds invest assets by lending to the general fund of the Treasury, these transactions should produce investment results similar to those that might be obtained by a prudent, private sector investor in Federal securities. If the general fund could not borrow from the trust funds, it would have to meet its borrowing needs by selling additional securities to just such private investors.

Investment neutrality has the following major elements:

Interest rate--The first and most important element of a neutral policy is the statutory interest rate paid on special obligations. Purchases (and subsequent redemptions) of special obligations are transactions conducted wholly within the Federal government. As such, there are no market forces that automatically establish an "equitable" rate of return. Legislative policy makers are therefore free, at least in theory, to set the interest rate at almost any level.

Initially, the interest rate for special obligations was a fixed rate. It clearly favored the Social Security program, because it was higher than the rate paid to private investors in similar, marketable Federal obligations. The law was changed in 1939 to base the rate on the average coupon rates paid on almost all U.S. obligations, and in 1956 to base it on coupon rates for longer-term U.S. obligations. In times of low inflation and relatively constant interest rates, the coupon rates (combined with a policy of one-year maturities on special obligations, adopted in 1944) were reasonable approximations of market yields. Because by the 1950s the trust fund investments were recognized as essentially long term in nature, the elimination of short-term coupon rates from the calculation was seen by the Congress as being more equitable, or neutral, than the previous formula.

In response to upward trends in interest rates, legislation to convert to a market-yield formula was adopted in 1960. The market-yield formula prevented the trust funds from being disadvantaged by coupon rates that were lower than current market values. The Congress intended this change, in the words of the Report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the 1960 legislation, "...to make interest earnings on the Government obligations held by the trust funds more nearly equivalent to the rate of return being received by people who buy Government securities in the open market."

The Congress also recognized in the 1960 legislation that trust fund investments, as foreseen at that time, were primarily long term, but that they had a short-term component. After consideration of a different, short-term interest rate for that "minor portion of the funds" needed to meet "current and near future benefit obligations," they concluded that equitable treatment could be achieved using only one rate. Whether or not the adjustment was technically accurate, the short-term component was acknowledged in the decision of the Congress to shorten the minimum maturity dates of marketable obligations used in the interest-rate calculation from 5 years to 4.

As OASDI asset levels declined and a financing crisis resulted early in the 1980s, it could be argued that observance of a neutrality principle should have required changing the interest-rate formula to one based on shorter term obligations. This would have made the rates on trust fund investments similar to the rates on short-term obligations that would be purchased by a private investor faced with the need for liquidity. Such a change was, in fact, suggested--but for very different reasons. Short-term rates were at that time higher than long-term rates, and some proposed that the trust funds be allowed to take advantage of this inversion of the normal rate and maturity relationship. In the end, the crisis passed without any alteration in the formula.

The chart below shows the interest rate on new issues for 1940 through 1998. Note the upward jump in 1960 when the current average market yield formula first took effect. The monthly interest rates underlying this chart may be found in appendix table A2.

Interest Rates on New, Special-Issue Obligations, 1940-98

see appendix table A2 for underlying data

Maturity structure--The administrative policies governing the maturity structure of special obligations in the trust fund portfolio are another element of neutrality. The administrative decision in the 1940s to assign short-term (1 year) maturities to special obligations was made in order to bring the coupon-rate interest formula then in use more closely into line with the market yields available to private investors. The change to a 1-to-15 year even spread of maturities, coupled with the adoption of the market yield interest formula in 1960, was viewed as the appropriate, neutral response to a changed situation. Trust fund assets could now be invested with long maturities at long-term market rates and, because trust fund balances were quite large, with only limited need for early redemption.

Adjustments in the policy for setting the maturities of special obligations have generally not been made since 1960, despite the changing circumstances of the trust funds. Maturities are less significant for the trust funds, however, than for the private investor. This is because special obligations bear long-term rates but, due to their redemption at par feature, have short-term (in fact, instant) liquidity with no risk of principal loss--an advantage not available to private investors. The administrative policy governing early redemption of special obligations, in combination with the policy of spreading maturities, is designed to compensate at least partially for, or neutralize, the advantage of no-risk liquidity.

Redemption policy-- Obligations are never redeemed before maturity unless needed to meet current withdrawals. Major redemptions of special obligations with longer-term maturities are usually necessary only when a trust fund is running serious deficits. Even when the income of a fund generally exceeds its outgo, however, some of the obligations which mature on the next June 30 must be redeemed monthly to pay benefits. Under the current policy of spreading maturities over 15 years, an obligation maturing on the next June 30 may bear a rate of interest based on average yields that existed anywhere from a few months (in the case of certificates of indebtedness) to almost 15 years earlier. Over time, as market yields vary and as trust fund reserves fluctuate, the actual ages and interest rates of obligations maturing on a particular date are likely to vary in a complex manner that may not be entirely predictable well in advance.

In turn, the redemption policy based on earliest maturity date produces a more or less random selection of special obligations to be redeemed. Their interest rates may be above or below current market yields. In comparison to obligations sold on the open market, redemption of special obligations at par using this procedure may produce an increase in the overall portfolio interest rate (when their rates are below current market yields), a decrease (when above current yields), or mixed results. This automatic, mechanistic approach to redemption, by producing somewhat random investment outcomes, tends to offset any advantage or disadvantage to the trust funds that might be created by redemption at par and, over time, confers a kind of rough neutrality to the process.

Neutrality not precise--It can be argued that the use of one average long-term interest rate is inappropriate for special obligations that have maturities ranging from a few months to 15 years, or at times when major disinvestment is predicted to be required in order to pay benefits. Similarly, the redemption at par feature of special obligations is important to the principle of security but, in and of itself, may produce non-neutral advantages or disadvantages for the trust funds. When the long-term trend of interest rates is upward, as was the case before 1982, the trust funds are potentially advantaged. On the other hand, the current maturity-setting policy can be disadvantageous under such conditions because securities with relatively lower interest rates will often be held for long time periods.

The principle of neutrality, as applied to trust fund investment, is therefore not scrupulously precise. Nor is a policy enacted as being neutral under one set of economic or trust fund conditions necessarily neutral under significantly changed conditions. Nonetheless, legislative and administrative policy makers have historically worked to create and maintain a generally neutral system of investment.

Principle 4: Minimal management of investment

Through a combination of legislative and administrative policies, management of trust fund investments is conducted using set procedures and formulas that largely eliminate discretionary decision-making. Active, day-to-day management of investments in response to changing economic conditions or needs, in the manner practiced by large private investors, is deliberately avoided.

Many of the key parameters of trust fund investment policy are set by law. The Managing Trustee, for example, does not have discretion to invest in other than Federal obligations or discretion as to what rates of interest to pay on special obligations. Nor can he choose not to invest the available assets of the funds (unless, arguably, he is constrained from doing so by other provisions of law).

The Managing Trustee does have the discretionary authority to invest in marketable Federal obligations if he determines that such investments would be in the public interest. He also exercises discretionary authority in determining the maturities of the obligations in which the trust funds invest, subject to the constraint that the maturities must be chosen with due regard for the needs of the funds. In addition, he has rather complete discretion as to the order of redemption of obligations held by the funds, provided that assets not needed to pay program costs remain invested.

In dealing with these discretionary authorities, Managing Trustees have consistently adopted highly mechanistic policies that avoid any active, day-to-day decision-making in managing trust fund investments. The de facto policy since the earliest days of the program has been largely to eschew investment in marketable obligations, even when the purchase of marketable obligations was legally preferred and might have resulted in higher returns on investment. Standardized, non-discretionary administrative policies for selecting the maturities of special obligations have been adopted and followed year after year. Further, Managing Trustees have determined that obligations may not be redeemed in advance of maturity unless redemption is necessary to pay program costs, and that the obligations that are redeemed will be selected following a non-discretionary procedure that ignores market conditions and other economic factors.

Administrative policy, in sum, has been designed to eliminate those elements of discretion that are granted by the law with respect to the daily management of trust fund investment. On those infrequent occasions when administrative policies have been changed in order to respond to changes in general economic conditions or in the law, a new set of non-discretionary procedures has simply been substituted for the old.

There are two fundamental reasons for this principle of minimal management. First, active management would almost certainly require actions that would be contrary to the principles of security and neutrality. The rationale for active management, to maximize the potential gain to the trust funds from investment, is a violation of the principle of neutrality. It could also entail the acceptance of some risk (e.g., through the purchase of marketable securities). Managing special obligations so as to maximize the return on trust fund investment--an objective that could be easily accomplished, for example, by redeeming low interest-rate special obligations at par and reinvesting at higher rates--would automatically disadvantage the general fund.

The second reason for minimal management is also rooted in the principle of neutrality. The Secretary of the Treasury is the Managing Trustee. For the Secretary to actively manage the investment of trust fund assets to the detriment of the general fund or, for that matter, to do the opposite, would involve a clear and unacceptable conflict of interest. Minimal management, employing policies designed to produce neutrality, avoids this dilemma.

 

Appendix

Table A1.--Investments Held at the End of September 1998 by the
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Trust Funds



Type of investment


Interest rate
(percent)


Maturity
years


Amount
(in millions)


Special issues:

 

Certificates of indebtedness:

5.375

1999

$18,872

 

 

5.750

1999

6,104

 

 

Bonds:

5.875

2000-2013

140,733

 

 

6.250

2000-2008

48,558

 

 

6.500

1999-2010

75,360

 

 

6.875

1999-2012

101,047

 

 

7.000

1999-2011

86,995

 

 

7.250

1999-2009

66,927

 

 

7.375

1999-2007

49,862

 

 

8.125

1999-2006

43,072

 

 

8.375

1999-2001

2,997

 

 

8.625

1999-2002

7,577

 

 

8.750

1999-2005

63,135

 

 

9.250

1999-2003

14,874

 

 

10.375

1999-2000

2,622

 

 

13.750

1999

1,492

Public issues:

 

Treasury bonds:

3.500

1998

5

 

 

7.625

2007

10

 

 

8.250

2005

4

 

 

11.750

2010

30

Total amount

730,277


 

Table A2.--Interest Rates (in Percent) on New Special-Issue Obligations, 1940-98


 

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

January

2.500

2.500

2.375

2.000

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

February

2.500

2.500

2.375

2.000

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

March

2.500

2.500

2.375

2.000

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

April

2.500

2.500

2.375

2.000

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

May

2.500

2.500

2.250

1.875

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

June

2.500

2.500

2.250

1.875

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

July

2.500

2.500

2.250

1.875

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

August

2.500

2.500

2.125

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.000

2.125

2.125

September

2.500

2.375

2.125

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.000

2.125

2.125

October

2.500

2.375

2.125

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

2.125

November

2.500

2.375

2.125

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

2.125

December

2.500

2.375

2.000

1.875

1.875

1.875

2.000

2.125

2.125

2.125

 

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

January

2.125

2.125

2.250

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.375

2.500

2.500

2.625

February

2.125

2.125

2.250

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.375

2.500

2.500

2.625

March

2.125

2.125

2.250

2.375

2.375

2.250

2.375

2.500

2.500

2.625

April

2.125

2.125

2.250

2.375

2.375

2.250

2.500

2.500

2.500

2.625

May

2.125

2.125

2.250

2.375

2.375

2.250

2.500

2.500

2.500

2.625

June

2.125

2.125

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.250

2.500

2.500

2.500

2.625

July

2.125

2.250

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.250

2.500

2.500

2.625

2.625

August

2.125

2.250

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.250

2.500

2.500

2.625

2.625

September

2.125

2.250

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.375

2.500

2.500

2.625

2.625

October

2.125

2.250

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.375

2.500

2.500

2.625

2.625

November

2.125

2.250

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.375

2.500

2.500

2.625

2.625

December

2.125

2.250

2.250

2.375

2.250

2.375

2.500

2.500

2.625

2.625

 

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

January

2.625

3.750

4.000

3.750

4.125

4.125

4.625

4.625

5.625

6.000

February

2.625

3.750

4.000

3.750

4.125

4.125

4.750

4.500

5.375

6.125

March

2.625

3.625

3.875

3.875

4.125

4.125

5.000

4.750

5.375

6.250

April

2.625

3.750

3.750

3.875

4.250

4.125

4.750

4.375

5.625

6.250

May

2.625

3.625

3.750

3.875

4.125

4.125

4.750

4.750

5.625

6.125

June

2.625

3.750

3.750

3.875

4.125

4.125

4.875

4.750

5.625

6.500

July

2.625

3.875

3.875

3.875

4.125

4.125

5.000

5.125

5.500

6.625

August

2.625

3.875

4.000

3.875

4.125

4.125

5.125

5.000

5.250

6.625

September

2.625

4.000

3.875

4.000

4.125

4.250

5.375

5.125

5.375

6.750

October

3.625

3.875

3.875

4.000

4.125

4.375

5.125

5.250

5.375

7.625

November

3.750

3.875

3.750

4.125

4.125

4.375

5.000

5.625

5.500

7.000

December

4.000

4.000

3.750

4.000

4.125

4.375

5.000

5.625

5.625

7.250

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

January

7.750

6.125

5.625

6.125

6.750

7.125

7.250

6.375

7.625

9.000

February

7.875

5.875

5.875

6.375

6.750

7.125

7.250

7.125

7.750

8.750

March

7.000

5.625

5.750

6.500

6.875

6.875

7.250

7.125

7.875

9.000

April

7.000

5.250

6.000

6.625

7.375

7.250

7.125

7.125

8.000

8.875

May

7.625

6.000

5.875

6.500

7.750

7.625

7.125

7.125

8.000

9.000

June

7.625

6.125

5.750

6.625

7.625

7.375

7.500

7.125

8.250

8.750

July

7.500

6.625

6.000

6.750

7.875

7.375

7.375

7.000

8.375

8.500

August

7.375

6.750

5.875

7.500

8.000

7.500

7.250

7.125

8.375

8.750

September

7.250

6.000

6.125

7.000

8.125

7.625

7.125

7.000

8.250

9.000

October

7.000

5.875

6.125

6.500

7.750

7.875

7.125

7.125

8.375

9.250

November

7.000

5.625

6.125

6.625

7.625

7.375

6.875

7.375

8.875

10.500

December

6.125

5.875

6.000

6.625

7.375

7.625

6.500

7.375

8.625

10.000

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

January

10.000

11.875

13.500

10.500

11.750

11.500

9.125

7.500

8.875

9.250

February

10.750

12.125

13.750

10.875

11.500

11.125

9.250

7.375

8.250

9.000

March

12.375

12.875

13.625

10.375

11.875

11.875

8.375

7.375

8.125

9.375

April

12.250

12.500

13.625

10.625

12.375

11.625

7.625

7.625

8.625

9.375

May

10.375

13.500

13.250

10.250

12.625

11.375

7.625

8.375

8.875

9.125

June

9.750

13.000

13.250

10.750

13.750

10.375

8.375

8.625

9.250

8.750

July

9.625

13.250

13.875

10.875

13.750

10.250

7.750

8.500

8.875

8.250

August

10.125

14.000

13.250

11.750

12.875

10.625

7.750

8.750

9.125

7.875

September

11.125

14.875

12.250

11.875

12.750

10.375

7.250

9.000

9.250

8.375

October

11.500

15.250

11.625

11.375

12.375

10.375

7.750

9.625

8.875

8.500

November

12.000

14.250

10.625

11.625

11.625

10.125

7.625

9.000

8.625

8.000

December

12.125

12.500

10.750

11.500

11.500

9.750

7.375

9.000

9.125

8.000

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

 

January

8.125

8.125

6.875

6.875

6.000

8.000

5.875

6.625

6.000

 

February

8.500

8.125

7.250

6.500

5.750

7.750

5.875

6.625

5.750

 

March

8.625

8.125

7.375

6.250

6.250

7.375

6.375

6.750

5.875

 

April

8.750

8.125

7.625

6.250

6.875

7.375

6.625

7.125

6.000

 

May

9.125

8.125

7.625

6.125

7.125

7.250

6.875

6.875

6.000

 

June

8.750

8.125

7.375

6.250

7.250

6.500

7.000

6.875

5.875

 

July

8.500

8.250

7.125

5.875

7.375

6.500

6.875

6.750

5.750

 

August

8.375

8.250

6.750

5.875

7.125

6.625

6.875

6.250

5.750

 

September

8.875

7.875

6.625

5.625

7.250

6.500

7.125

6.625

5.375

 

October

8.875

7.500

6.500

5.625

7.750

6.375

6.875

6.375

4.875

 

November

8.625

7.500

6.875

5.625

7.875

6.250

6.500

6.125

5.125

 

December

8.375

7.375

7.000

5.875

8.000

6.000

6.250

6.125

5.125

 


1 This note is indebted to work done by Ronald Davis, who first compiled the investment policies and practices in 1986 while working for the Social Security Administration as its liaison to the public members of the Board of Trustees. Since then, there has been little change in investment policies.

2 The Department of the Treasury announced on December 21, 1998, that it had made a programming error in computing the average market yield. The error, affecting interest rates in recent years only, caused calculation of yields on callable securities to always be on a "yield to maturity" basis. Yields on those callable securities trading above par, however, should have been calculated on a "yield to call" basis. As a result, the Social Security Trust Funds currently hold certain securities that earn a slightly higher interest rate (1/8 of one percent) than they should had the interest rate calculation been based on prevalent industry practice. The error was corrected with the rate effective for January 1999.

3 The estimated tax transfers are subsequently adjusted when actual data on taxable wages become available.


Post-publication supplementary information.

Notes published in the 1990s